www.eastafricaforum.net http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssEnergyNews/idUSL159192220080715
July 15, 2008 OiLibya buys Shell's Ethiopia, Djibouti operationsADDIS ABABA (Reuters) - Libyan petroleum dealer OiLibya this month bought the retail business of Royal Dutch/Shell RD.AS SHEL.L in Ethiopia and Djibouti for an undisclosed price, a Shell official said on Tuesday.
"OiLibya has formally entered the Ethiopian market, after signing an agreement on July 10, 2008, to acquire 100 percent of Shell's Ethiopia and Djibouti petroleum retail business," Shell Ethiopia official Bahru Temesgen told Reuters.
He declined to reveal the amount of money OiLibya, owned by Libyan holding company Libyan African Portfolio (LAP) Greenco, paid. OiLibya has bought other retail petroleum dealers in Africa, including taking over ExxonMobil's (XOM.N: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz)'s business in Kenya.
Bahru said the sale was consistent with Shell's global strategy to focus on oil exploration and get out of retail business.
Shell's operation in Ethiopia started in 1929 and had built 200 retail service stations across Ethiopia and was covering about 30 percent of Ethiopia's petroleum needs, Bahru said.
Bahru said the agreement between Shell Ethiopian and Djibouti and OiLibya also included retaining all Shell employees.
Two local petroleum distributing companies, the National Oil Company and Yetebaberut Beherawi Petroleum (YBP) plus Kenya's Kobil and Nile Petroleum are in the Ethiopian market.
http://www.addisfortune.com/Vol%208%20No%20427%20
Archive/Guelleh%20Sees%20Eritrean%20Leaders%20Paranoid-Frustrated.htm Fortune, Ethiopia July 13, 2008 Guelleh Sees Eritrean Leaders Paranoid, Frustrated
The recent summit of the African Union (AU) heads of state held at Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, condemned what it called Eritrean military action against Djibouti. This follows an Eritrean incursion to Ras Dumera in April 2008, a territory north of Djibouti .
Although boycotted by Eritrea , the Summit demanded a complete withdrawal of soldiers by Eritrea from the disputed areas and for a peaceful resolution of the problem. It is another demand from a multilateral organization. The Security Council of the United Nations passed a similar resolution in June.
Analysts predict this may escalate to a regional conflict following an exchange of fire between soldiers of the two countries on June 10. Ismael Omar Guelleh, president of Djibouti , shares this view of the regional nature of the conflict. In a brief exclusive interview with Fortune last week, held in his office in Djibouti , he said Eritrea ’s leaders are keen to link the problem with Djibouti to their problem with Ethiopia , and they are unhappy about peace deal made among Somali warring factions.
President Guelleh, who is perplexed with President Issayas Afeworki’s conduct in denying the existence of problems along their common border, characterized Eritrean leaders’ behaviour as “frustrated and paranoid.” The following is the excerpt of the interview held with Tamrat G. Giorgis, Managing Editor, last week.
Question: Mr. President, let me start with the latest. How do you describe the situation between your country and Eritrea ? There was a discussion at the UN Security Council about it two weeks ago.
President Guelleh: The situation is calm; there is no fighting. We have pulled three kilometres back from the mountain because of the first demand and declaration by the President of the Security Council to go back to the situation. But, they [their soldiers] are still there.
We have chosen to go to international and regional organizations; as you well know, there has been a second declaration, which reinforced the first one that decided on sending a mission. This paved the way for another resolution on June 27, which meant to make the Eritrean government abide to the demands.
Nevertheless, the response from them to the first and second declarations, and during the second meeting, was ‘Why is the Security Council only concerned when it comes to Djibouti , and not Bademe, which is also another international issue?’ They want to relate the two problems as a way of convincing the members of the Security Council to resolve the two problems at the same time. But, that will not be the case.
Q: I tried to talk to as many Djiboutians as I could. The one thing many of them do not seem to understand, and be able to explain, is the objective behind Eritrea ’s actions. Now you are telling me that may be they want to get the international community’s attention. Eritrea may want to send a message to them that, “If you are so concerned about Djibouti ’s issue, why are you not as concerned about Ethiopia ’s?” Is that what is all behind it?
First of all, they denied the fact that there was a clash, any deaths as a result of it, or anything. When they invaded us and took over the place, I had a telephone conversation with President Issayas Afeworki, who told me that nothing had happened. He said there had only been minimal exchange of fire. However, he had occupied Djibouti ’s territory at that time.
Q: Who initiated the conversation? Did you call him?
I called him. He said, “We are not only neighbours; we are a member of the same family. I have not invaded your country. There is nothing going on.” I told him I had photographs that show trenches and thousands of soldiers. I told him I would go to the site the next day to see for myself, to which he said, “You can go.” I went there and saw bulldozers and graders.
Q: That was what President Issayas told the Yemen President, Ali Abdullah Saleh; that what you said was a, I quote, “complete fabrication.”
Yes. He also told the leader of Qatar that there was no problem. He told the same thing to the President of Sudan. What kind of personality is that?
Q: Eritrea ’s Permanent Ambassador to the UN, Araya Desta, used words such as “manufactured news”, and more so, he accused Djibouti of being a “Trojan Horse” for Ethiopia and the United States . What do you feel about these statements?
Those are insults. They seem to want to be a super-power because they want to control the Strait of Bab-el Mandeb [a strategic passage located between the Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sea , a.k.a Gate of Tears]. They are also paranoid for they say, “We are in Musa Ali and Bure, Zalamebesa, as well as Bademe fronts.
There is something wrong because the Ethiopians are not pushing us, or doing anything.” They are so tired now, they want to see something changed. They have information - rather fabricated, and perhaps out of frustration, or paranoia, or I don’t know what - that there are now Ethiopians soldiers at Camp Le Monier [an American military base behind Djibouti international airport] trained, and they are now planning to come by the Djiboutian side.
Q: After they made the incursion, Djibouti was quiet for weeks, instead of alerting the international community. Wasn’t this unusual?
We did not want to rush; we wanted to give priority to negotiations, to handling the problem through peaceful means and other channels.
Q: But you were criticized for appeasement of Eritrean belligerences. Eritrea has a record of attacking Yemen , Sudan and Ethiopia , yet you were not bold enough to confront them right away.
Our purpose was to show to the international community what kind of regime they have. We used to have people coming from there; for instance, an Eritrean admiral was abducted by them in Dubai , because he did not want to go back after being sent on a mission. When he arrived here on Eritrean Airlines [on its way to Asmara ], we saved him.
Q: Does Eritrean Airlines still fly to Djibouti ?
No! They used to have three flights a week, but because of lack of finance, they terminated the two. They had maintained the one, but we stopped it after the incident.
Q: Former United States ’ Ambassador to Ethiopia , David Shinn (PhD), said after the military clash a few weeks ago that the conflict was an isolated incident, and would not escalate into anything further. Is that also your assessment; that there will be no such conflicts in the future?
Who knows? This is Mr. Shinn’s assessment; he may know the President better than we do. But, we remain vigilant and up until they go back to their base, we will not leave them alone.
Q: How much of this problem has to do with Somalian issue because it just happened at the same time as there was . . .
It is a combination of this paranoia and the Somali issue. He [President Issayas] refused to listen to anyone from the United Nations who wanted to talk about the Somali issue, because he wants the war to continue so that he can hold a card against Ethiopia and weaken them.
Q: Prime Minister Meles Zenawi met Ethiopian businesspeople at about the same time when the problem occurred. They told him their concerns about security on the Ethio-Djibouti corridor. The Prime Minister said Ethiopia is ready and capable of protecting the national interest, whatever it takes. What does this mean to you?
We understand them.
Q: Would you accept Ethiopia ’s military assistance, if provided?
Of course! If it is needed, why not?
Q: The preferred strategy for President Issayas, whenever he has conflict with his neighbours, seems to be creating, coordinating, and financing insurgencies when one looks at what happened in Sudan, Ethiopia, and even Chad. Are you not concerned that you are next in line?
Not at all! I am at peace with my people, and he knows that.
Q: Mr. President, this is your second term in office. Do you desire to run for another term?
No!
Q: There will not be constitutional rewriting!
No! no!
Q: How would you like to be remembered when you leave office? What would like your legacy be?
A simple citizen; I have done what I could do in 12 years, whether for the economy, or anything. I have had successes, as well as failures. I would leave it to you journalists to assess what I have done, and whether or not they were good.
Q: Who would you like to see replace you when you leave office?
I am not a king.
________________
http://business.africanpath.com/article.cfm?articleId=67109
Awate, Opposition Eritrean webstite based in US
July 15, 2008
Eritrea: Isaias Afwerki on the Path to Chaos Isaias Afewerki is often credited with both today's worsening living conditions in Eritrea, as well as for bringing the nation independence in 1991. Photo by United States Federal Government.
It is now official: the ruling regime has spilled Eritrean blood fighting all our neighbors: Yemen, Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti. In every case, the hot-headed and impulsive actions of the ruling regime harmed the interest of Eritrea and diminished its reputation. And in every case, Eritrea’s interests could have been secured better if a peaceful approach had been tried. The conflict with Djibouti is yet another ill-conceived strategy borne of the regime’s all-consuming obsession with Ethiopian politics.
Obsession With Ethiopian Politics
Since 1999, when it convinced itself that the Horn of Africa is not big enough for the incumbent governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia, the Eritrean regime has been making woefully inaccurate predictions about the Ethiopian government’s lifespan and working to reduce them. In 2005, it actually thought that the 2005 Ethiopian elections would see the toppling of its nemesis, the TPLF. Not in the elections, but in the outrage that would ensue following election irregularities: either via the withholding of crucial funds from Europe, or an uprising from the people.
Neither happened.
It had also hoped that an implementation of the EEBC ruling would result in clear loss of territories, like Badme, for which Ethiopia paid heavily—resulting in outrage and uprising by Ethiopians.
That hasn’t happened either.
The regime blames the US, particularly the State Department, for both. It has concluded that the only way that Ethiopia can change is if the US orders it to change. But how to get the US to come around?
To unhook the US from Ethiopia, the Eritrean regime recognizes that it has to have leverage, ability to deliver on something that the US would value highly. Such as a stable Ethiopia and Somalia. And to deliver stability, it must first create instability throughout the Horn of Africa—including in formerly stable portions of Somalia, like Somaliland and Puntland, as well as in Djibouti. To Isaias Afwerki, then, Djibouti is just an opportunity to create chaos in the Horn--a disorder out of which only he can command order.
To help him achieve this goal, he uses two actors: Ethiopian opposition groups and Somali opposition groups.
Ethiopian opposition groups hosted in Eritrea include the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogadeni National Liberation Front (ONLF), the Sidamo movement, the Tigray People’s Democratic Movement (TPDM), and the Ethiopian People’s Patriotic Front (EPPF.) All have armed groups.
The Eritrean regime also hosts (and facilitated the creation of) the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS), an umbrella for Somali expats, of whom the dominant group is the Islamic Court Union (ICU.) The ICU also has an armed wing which, together with the Muqawama (Resistance) and the Shabbab (Youth) have been battling Somali and Ethiopian troops in Somalia.
There is no ideological coherence to Eritrea's foreign policy. Eritrean Islamist groups are illegal in Eritrea but Somali Islamist groups get unlimited support. The difference? The Eritrean Islamist groups are not shooting at Ethiopian soldiers. In the 1990s, the Eritrean regime, which now congratulates itself for its sympathies to revolutionaries, was only too happy to ignore or to participate in the liquidation of the same revolutionaries in Ethiopia (such as OLF and ONLF) that it is supporting now. The most dramatic of all is how Somalia's Aweys, a former foe, has become an ally.
Somalia or Bust
The original plan was to open up so many war fronts with Ethiopia (via Sudan, via Eritrea and via Somalia and within Ethiopia proper), that the Ethiopian government would either collapse or sue for peace. But despite endless prophesies by Isaias Afwerki that the Ethiopian government was approaching 0 hour, that hasn’t happened. The Ethiopian opposition groups were unable to coalesce into a cohesive fighting force. (Last month, they agreed to unify their armed wings.)
In contrast, the Somali insurgents have been, with each passing month, controlling more and more territories, and inflicting heavier casualties on the Ethiopian and Somali governments. They had even managed to export the conflict to Somaliland and Puntland who, unbelievably, were engaged in their own “border conflict.”
Earlier this year, the Eritrean regime had a change in strategy: to focus the assault on Ethiopia’s weakest point—Somalia. To achieve this goal, the Ethiopian opposition groups were moved from their bases in the Western lowlands of Eritrea to the Denakil Depression. And, for the first time, arms and soldiers were smuggled to Somalia via Djibouti.
To Somalia With Love
For a more comprehensive understanding of the Eritrea-Djibouti conflict, one must read the April 2008 report of the UN Monitoring Group (Arms Embargo Enforcement) on Somalia. The Committee faulted Yemen for allowing its porous borders to be used by smugglers; Ethiopia and Uganda, for selling arms in the Somali arms bazaar; and Eritrea, for training and arming Somali insurgents and sneaking them to Somalia. There isn’t much remarkable about the report except for the following: how the arms and soldiers were sneaked to Somalia.
The Monitoring Group has found that during the current mandate period [October 2007 to April 2008] a number of States continue to be in violation of the embargo, while some trans-shipment routes have changed. Eritrea is now supplying weapons along the borders of Djibouti… [emphasis added]
During the current mandate, the Monitoring Group received information with regard to new routes being used by violators of the embargo. For example, weapons flow in from Eritrea by a route along the Eritrean-Djiboutian border via Zone 5 (Ogaden), from Ethiopia into Somalia (see sect. II.C). [emphasis added]
Also noticeable during the current mandate was the use of “low tech” means of transport to bring arms into Somalia. Donkey carts, camels and horses have often been used as means of transport, for example, on the Eritrea-Djibouti border, and inland from Kismayo. As a result, tracing arms shipments has become more difficult. [emphasis added]
In its report, the Monitoring Group disclosed that smuggling weapons to Somalia via the Eritrea-Djibouti border was a “new route”, a “noticeable” change in the “trans-shipment routes.” The Monitoring Group reports that Eritrea not only smuggled weapons through the Djibouti border, but also fighters of Al-Shabab (the most extremist elements of the Somali opposition) after their training in Massawa and Asab.
The Monitoring Group gets inputs from the parties involved and sent a letter to Eritrea on March 7. The Eritrean representative to the UN responded in March 20, denying the UN accusations. The Monitoring Group’s report was distributed by the UN on April 24, 2008.
On May 5, the government of Djibouti filed a complaint (Document entitled: Border Crisis Between Djibouti and Eritrea) with the Security Council against Eritrea, and included a timeline of activities dating back to February 4, 2008.
In May, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi announced that his country is “prepared to secure its vital trade route” with Djibouti, in the event an Eritrea-Djibouti border breaks out and, according to Eritrea’s ambassador to the UN, Ethiopia now has militarized presence in Jebel Mussa, at the tripartite border of Eritrea-Djibouti-and Ethiopia.
Meanwhile, in a blow to Isaias Afwerki who wants to control the Somali portfolio, the UN representative attempting to reconcile the Somali opposition and government, chose Djibouti as the venue.
In an interview with Reuters, Isaias was uncharacteristically speechless about this move which he, no doubt, expected to amount to nothing—a reasonable expectation, given Somalia’s peace-making history. Surprisingly, the meeting between the ICU and the TFG, led to a breakthrough agreement which quickly won the support of the UN, the US and regional powerhouse Saudi Arabia. This, once again, left Isaias Afwerki fuming and near isolation.
And when Isaias Afwerki is fuming and near isolation, he always strikes.
Dealing With Eritrea’s Outlaw Regime
The speed and the resoluteness with which the International Community has reacted to Isaias Afwerki’s provocation are testimony to the world’s disgust with his endless adventurism.
Within days of Djibouti’s complaint, the United Nations, the African Union, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Conference, and even IGAD have condemned his aggression and demanded that he reverse it. Old habits die hard, and he is likely to want to stretch and stall and when he does, the United Nations Security Council, the US and the EU must impose punitive measures against him.
Like what? We believe a good beginning would be for the International Community to look into a petition that was presented by the Eritrean Global Solidarity (signed by thousands of Eritreans) in February 2006. The petition called for the following actions to be taken against the Eritrean regime:
A ban on entry visas to all Isaias regime officials who seek to travel to Western nations.
Curtailing the regime's ability to raise funds in foreign countries.
Stopping its covert and overt international commercial, banking and other enterprises.
Assist in lifting the campaign of intimidation the Isaias regime imposes on Eritreans living in the Western nations.
The Eritrean regime requires crisis and war to elongate its stay in power. It needs free movement in, and extraction of money from, the Eritrean Diaspora. Good hearted foreign governments cannot claim to be ignorant about the injustices and inhumanity inflicted on Eritrea by its unelected rulers.
By now, all concerned should reach the conclusion that the time for diplomatic niceties and attempts to persuade the Eritrean regime to change its modus operandi will bear no fruit. Stronger measures that target the regime without affecting the long-suffering people are long overdue: the peace and stability of the region require it.
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