A week in Ethiopia

A Week in the Horn (September 12,2008)

· A Presidential decree on the Benadir Administrion

· An attack on Ethiopia emerging in the US Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee

· Ethiopia’s New Year hopes for regional peace

· Professor Menkhaus – a disappointingly misleading report on Somalia

· The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Millennium Year



· This week, the details of implementation for the proposed changes for Benadir region and Mogadishu became clearer as the process laid out in the Addis Ababa ‘road map’ appear to have begun. The President has taken the important step of issuing a decree, at the request of the Prime Minister, to remove the previous administration and for it to handover its duties to a temporary Upper Level Committee of ten members. The decree was supposed to take immediate effect on September 9th, the day it was issued, but it has yet to be implemented though expectations are that the hand over will take place tomorrow.

The Upper Level Committee is to run the day-to-day activities of Benadir for fifteen days while the next stage is implemented. This allows for each of the 16 districts of Mogadishu to choose a 23 member local council. In turn, each council will choose their own leadership and their own district commissioner. Each of these councils will function until the end of the transitional period next year. Once in place, each council will also elect three of its members to represent the district on a Benadir Council, making a total of 48. This will then elect the Mayor/Governor of Benadir from among its members.

While there has been some progress on the issue of the Benadir administration, there has been a series of unnecessary delays over the nomination and acceptance of the additional ministers. Parliament has not been co-operating with the executive. Last week it fully endorsed the government in an overwhelming vote of confidence. Now, by refusing to accept the government’s proposals on the reinstatement of the ten ministers (only two of whom actually had their resignations accepted) Parliament is in effect working for the dissolution of the executive.

There are some in Parliament who appear to be acting more on the basis of self-interest and paying little attention to the national interest. In addition, the critically important restructuring of the security apparatus, also agreed in Addis Ababa, has yet to begin. In the meantime, the situation in Kismayo continues to be in a state of flux. Those who claim to have set up an administration there have not succeeded in establishing complete order, and rifts between them and some local ICU leaders seems to be contributing to the continued uncertainty in the city.

· Ethiopia enjoys healthy relations with the United States of America. A long historical relationship has, in recent times, witnessed qualitative improvement as issues linking us have multiplied. Nonetheless, there have been frequent challenges to our friendly relations. The annual report from the US State Department on human rights around the world has never attempted any objective assessment of Ethiopia, making sweeping and unsubstantiated allegations against the Government.

However, the Government of Ethiopia has never considered the reports as any major impediment to the US/Ethiopia relationship despite their lack of objectivity and the excuse they create for others less knowledgeable about the realities of the situation in Ethiopia. In this regard the efforts by one branch of the US Government, Congress, have gone well beyond this. Following numerous hearings which have seldom been constructive the House of Representatives passed an ‘Ethiopian Democracy and Accountability Act of 2007’. Now a ‘Support for Democracy and Human Rights in Ethiopia Act of 2008’ has been introduced in the Senate.

This draft is of concern because it makes no effort to provide any context for criticism. Moreover, the timing is bewildering with Congress about to close in order to participate in the Presidential elections. It is a surprise to find that this issue is of such interest to members of Congress at this stage in the life of the present Congress. This is particularly so in light of what the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee himself says about the critical role Ethiopia plays in the sub-region.

This draft bill is regrettable not just because of factual errors, which are numerous, or the lack of accurate information portrayed, but because the message is that Ethiopia, despite its friendship with the US, can still be dictated simply because there will be no consequences for the US. It is disingenuous to couch such a bill in friendly terms with claims to support democracy in Ethiopia when no such bill would be introduced against other governments regarded as friends of the US. Ethiopia is being targeted with complete disregard for building the mutual trust between the two countries so vital for long-term Ethiopia/US relations.

· While the Ethiopian New Year 2001 provides renewed commitment to forge ahead with the impressive economic development registered over the past five years, and with the democratization process, there is no doubt that a great deal remains to be done to ensure durable peace in the region. One critical aspect of this remains the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. For Ethiopia, this situation could easily have been resolved previously on the basis of the two components of the Algiers Agreement.

The first, the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities signed on June 18, 2000, at Algiers, provided for the deployment of a peacekeeping mission with the detailed mandate to create a Temporary Security Zone and for punitive measures to be taken under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter should either party violate this agreement which were meant “..to contribute to the reduction of tension and to the establishment of a climate of calm and confidence, as well as to create conditions conducive to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the conflict…”

The peace settlement as concluded under the Algiers Agreement of December 2008, included the delimitation and demarcation of the border based on pertinent colonial treaties and applicable international law, and allowed for the establishment of a neutral Claims Commission “...to decide through binding arbitration all claims for loss, damage or injury by one Government against the other, and by [their] nationals…”.

The expectation was for Algiers Agreements to be implemented in synergy and provide a conclusive settlement of the dispute. The various elements of the Agreements have been gradually implemented in different ways.

The Claims Commission, for example, has completed the liability stage and is now expected to detail its compensation awards. One of its most significant decisions was its finding that Eritrea violated Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter when it invaded areas peacefully administered by Ethiopia. On the other hand, the Boundary Commission adopted its delimitation decision in 2002; implementation, however, could not proceed because Eritrea did not want to proceed to demarcation in line with international practice.

This stalled the peace process for some time before Ethiopia produced its five-point Peace Plan whose fundamentals were: the proposal to resolve the dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea only through peaceful means; to resolve the root causes of the conflict through dialogue with the view to normalizing relations between the two countries; to accept, in principle, the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission decision; and to start dialogue immediately with the view to implementing the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission’s decision in a manner consistent with the promotion of sustainable peace and brotherly ties between the two peoples.

Eritrea not only rejected these proposals but responded by imposing restrictions on UNMEE, expelling certain nationals serving in UNMEE, and by deploying its own military in the TSZ. At the request of the Security Council, the then Secretary General tried to unlock the dispute by appointing a Special Envoy. Eritrea rejected the appointment and refused to receive the envoy. The Security Council passed resolution 1640(2005) threatening Eritrea with sanctions if it did not lift the restrictions it had imposed on UNMEE. With the Security Council expected to consider the possibility of sanctions on Eritrea following the Report of the Secretary General, the Witnesses to the Algiers Agreement then convened in New York at the invitation of the United States to adopt an initiative aimed at breaking the impasse. The Security Council supported this and called on the Boundary Commission to re-convene meetings with the two parties.

The Commission resumed its work on 10 March 2006 when Ethiopia clarified its stance that its acceptance of the delimitation decision was without any precondition, a point the Commission fully and publicly acknowledged. Eritrea, however, then made it clear that it would no longer cooperate with the Commission.

Indeed, this initiative failed to break the impasse in the peace process because Eritrea refused to lift restrictions on UNMEE or cooperate in the appointment of a neutral facilitator to assist in the demarcation process and enter into technical discussion with Ethiopia as the Witnesses had highlighted in their initiative. Eritrea’s persistent rejection of all avenues for peace effectively blocked the possibilities of a legally valid demarcation process. Faced by this intransigence, the Boundary Commission sought a way out by suggesting ‘virtual’ demarcation in lieu of physical demarcation.

Ethiopia made it clear that this course of action could only be considered ultra vires and that Ethiopia was not obligated to accept it. Indeed, the Security Council in fact subsequently adopted resolution 1798(2008) demanding physical demarcation of the boundary, making it clear that any transfer of territorial control could only arise after “…the final status of the contested areas… will be determined at the end of the delimitation and demarcation of the border and, if need be, through an appropriate mechanism of arbitration”, pursuant to the Algiers Agreements.

So the questions of sovereignty and occupation that Eritrea has raised remain irrelevant, even frivolous, in the absence of valid demarcation and a transfer of territory in accordance with this.

Rather than respond to any of the criticisms and demands from the Security Council, Eritrea actually intensified the severe restrictions it imposed on UNMEE. This led to the Security Council’s termination of UNMEE’s mandate. Unfortunately, Eritrea, after starting the war unlawfully, being found liable for this by the Claims Commission, meeting out humiliating treatment to UNMEE, violating the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement by deploying military forces inside the TSZ, continuously threatening to use force and carrying out multiple efforts at destabilization in the region, has gone unpunished.

Verbal condemnation by the Security Council, in the absence of any punitive measures under the Charter of the United Nations or the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, has emboldened Eritrea to remain defiant to all the Council’s numerous resolutions demanding responses from Eritrea. In this context, it should be noted that in terminating UNMEE’s mandate, the Security Council, in resolution 1827(2008), reaffirmed the integrity of the TSZ. Under the Algiers Agreements, the TSZ and UNMEE’s mandate end only when valid demarcation has been conducted in accordance with the Agreements and international law.

Now, of course, all this is behind us and the problem is no longer an issue of the technicalities of boundary demarcation. Eritrea, with its persistent efforts to destabilize Ethiopia has made it clear that it is not prepared to reach any accommodation with the present government of Ethiopia. In fact this is not something new. It has been the main problem from the beginning. Despite this, in this New Year, Ethiopia will maintain its firm intention to get a peaceful resolution of the dispute with Eritrea. It remains fully committed to a lasting and durable peace between the two countries through negotiation and discussion. It can only hope Eritrea will reciprocate.

· Earlier this month, Professor Ken Menkhaus produced a report for the Washington-based NGO ENOUGH which until this year exclusively focused on analyses of genocide and crimes against humanity in Darfur, Congo and Uganda. It is now extending its interest to Somalia. This paper: Somalia, A Country in Peril, a Policy Nightmare, by Professor Menkhaus, is apparently intended to be the first of two strategy papers.

It provides an analysis of the current crisis in Somalia and looks at why international policies toward Somalia have produced some disastrous, if unintended, results, making a case for an urgent review of those policies. The second report will apparently explore options and make recommendations for a new, more effective, international approach to Somalia.

It is this that makes it particularly necessary to offer some comments and criticisms of the errors of fact and underlying assumptions that have disappointingly crept into Professor Menkhaus’s analysis. In particular, there are serious and fundamental errors relating to his ascription of Ethiopian motives towards Somalia, and in the analysis of Ethiopian/United States relations. Any proposed strategy, any suggested policy options do need to be anchored in reality and based on accurate information. And herein lies the problem.

Professor Menkhaus provides a damning list of failures by the international community and concludes that “we have become part of the problem rather than the solution”. Despite this critique, however, he still manages to underplay the most essential failure, the refusal to provide support and resources for the TFG after November 2004.

One major reason was the entirely erroneous assessment of western observers to the Mbagathi conference that Ethiopia was manipulating the voting. The international community similarly failed to provide the necessary backing after the TFG’s takeover of Mogadishu in December 2006. It has yet to throw real weight behind the Djibouti Agreement.

In this context, irrespective of whether Professor Menkhaus is correct to say the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops is essential for peace (it isn't, it is in fact a demand of Al-Shabaab and of Eritrea's allies), we would recall that Ethiopia has consistently, since early 2007, declared its desire to withdraw as soon as possible. Ethiopian troops have remained in Somalia because the AU and other regional and international organizations have asked the Government to keep them there, to avoid leaving a power vacuum.

Ironically, the very elements asking Ethiopia to stay are those that have failed to support the creation of AMISOM or push seriously for a UN peacekeeping force or a UN sponsored stabilization force. Incidentally, in this context it should be noted that it is not possible for any AU or a UN force to be seen as neutral by Al-Shabaab however carefully their mandate might be drawn up whatever Professor Menkhaus may believe. He appears quite unaware of just how comprehensive Al-Shabaab's intentions actually are. They do not include a future for the TFG or any of its allies, internal or external, and no moderates, let alone anyone else.

Professor Menkhaus emphasizes that the international community’s effort at state-building in Somalia, minimal though this may have been, is now in a state of profound crisis. In part this is, he says, because the TFG is not a government of national unity, only one party in a civil war.

It is also because Western donors are supporting the wrong things. In this context, he claims, support for TFG security forces merely provides assistance to hard-line elements which control these forces and who accepted the Djibouti Agreement as an opportunity to split their opponents. Western donors should therefore stop such assistance.

This, however is based on a serious misconception. Support for the TFG’s security forces, far from strengthening hardliners opposed to the Djibouti Agreement and the peace and reconciliation process, actually directly assists the government which is headed by the Prime Minister and which is committed to the peace process and to the Djibouti Agreement. Bringing an end to assistance to TFG police and security would in fact threaten the continued existence of the TFG and the possibilities of peace and reconciliation.

Professor Menkhaus appears to believe Al-Shabaab should be brought into the peace process. This appears particularly implausible given Al-Shabaab's own long campaign of assassination and terror, and its statements, and the response of most Somalis to the organization.

Whether or not the Asmara fraction of the ARS, of Sheikh Aweys, might become involved is also highly doubtful, if only because of Eritrean pressure. Eritrea, whose role Professor Menkhaus largely ignores, is of course not interested in Somalia or Somali opposition fractions; it is using Somalia and Somalis as a proxy in its continual efforts to destabilize Ethiopia.

There are also some maverick warlords who have lined up with Al-Shabaab or the Asmara ARS, including Sheikh Yusuf 'Inde Adde' whose name was a byword for violence and misgovernment in the Lower Shebelle region long before 2006, and Sheikh Hassan 'Turki' who now calls himself an 'elder' of Al-Shabaab. There can be no contradiction in linking the peace-building and reconciliation agenda to a robust strategy to strengthen moderates and contain hardliners from wherever they originate.

Professor Menkhaus is a Somali specialist, but it is still most surprising that he apparently appears to find Ethiopia’s policies so difficult to understand. He certainly gets them wrong. Ethiopia has shown absolutely no willingness to allow Mogadishu-based warlords to re-arm. Indeed, quite the reverse, as the briefest visit to Mogadishu would underline.

Nor does Ethiopia have any desire to render Mogadishu ungovernable in order to prevent hard-line Islamists asserting control as soon as Ethiopian troops leave. This is a typically bizarre foreign conspiracy theory of the sort usually peddled by ignorant US academics like Dr. Michael Weinstein of PINR who appears to know nothing of Somalia, and whose ramblings are a compendium of opposition fantasies and media exaggerations, seldom bearing any relation to reality. Professor Menkhaus is not usually to be numbered in such company.

He can, and does make numerous accurate observations but he categorizes Ethiopian policies as difficult and problematic. In fact, far from being a “wild card” in the Somali crisis, Ethiopia is the one element that can claim consistency. If there is any “wild card” in the Somali situation it is Eritrea. Ethiopia may not always get it right, but it can legitimately claim it tries.

Ethiopia's policies towards Somalia are quite transparent and its motives perfectly clear, as they have been for the last seventeen years. Ethiopia's actions have always been presaged on certain basic principles that a peaceful Somalia with a functional government is necessary for the well-being of both the sub-region and Ethiopia as well as the peoples of Somalia and Ethiopia, and able to deal the activities of extremists and terrorists.

Surprisingly, Professor Menkhaus seems to have forgotten Ethiopia’s long investment in the search for peace in Somalia, going back, indeed, to 1991 when the advent of a new government in Ethiopia, and the overthrow of Siad Barre, opened the way for a change in an often stormy earlier relationship. The Ethiopian government has taken every effort to try and encourage the creation of a stable government in Somalia ever since it came to power, though all too often these efforts have come to nothing because of the lack of international support.

These efforts include: the Bahr Dar meeting of Somali factions (1992); the Addis Ababa Agreement (1993), Ethiopia’s mandate to facilitate a Somali settlement from IGAD and the OAU (1993), the Sodere consultation meeting and agreement (1996), the Arta conference (2000), and the Eldoret/Mbagathi conference (2002-2004) and the creation of the TFG and the TFIs in 2004. Indeed it sees these latter institutions as currently the only viable solution for Somalia’s problems.

It is on this basis that Ethiopia responded to the TFG’s requests for assistance against internal and external enemies in 2006, and has subsequently been active in providing support and training for the effort to recreate an administrative structure in Somalia.

There is currently a team of experts from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance and Information, and the Federal Police, and the Revenue and Customs Authorities in Mogadishu involved in extensive training programs, not for the first time.

Ethiopia has also carried out extensive training for police and security forces. Would it be necessary to remind Professor Menkhaus that the Ethiopian Government began its efforts for peace in Somalia towards the end of 1991 even before it had set up a regular army and before its own domestic security had been fully established throughout the country? Ethiopia’s policies towards Somalia are far from diabolical as the Professor implies.

Ethiopia has been quite consistent in its efforts to bring back peace, national reconciliation and security in Somalia. The problems of Somalia have always had a regional dimension of course, and Ethiopia’s concerns have never been purely altruistic.

It is, of course, mindful of its own national interests, but these in no way conflict with the interests of the people of Somalia, nor of those of the sub-region as we have emphasized on previous occasions.


Ethiopia wants to see the re-creation of a Somali state which is peaceful, stable and prepared to co-exist with its neighbors on the basis of principles of international law.

It has always been obvious that a revived Somali state, with peaceful and mutually managed borders, would be in Ethiopia’s own national interests. Ethiopia’s consistent position has been that anarchy in Somalia is not in the interests of the peoples of Somalia or of Ethiopia. However, it has never overestimated its capacity to influence or control the process or forgotten that any peace or reconciliation process in Somalia must be owned by Somalis.

Ethiopia has continuously worked for a win-win solution for the peoples of both countries. It will continue to support peace and stability in Somalia.

Professor Menkhaus is certainly right to suggest that an undated comprehensive and integrated international strategy for Somalia is needed, but even more necessary is to get the strategy right.

That can only happen if the analysis is correct. We would repeat: what is needed is to identify the problems and solutions accurately and provide the real basis for such a strategy. Unfortunately this report fails to do so. As Professor Menkhaus notes the human cost of continual failure is unacceptable. It is a pity that this report will do no more than continue to contribute to such failure.


· Wednesday this week marked the end of the first year of Ethiopia's new Millennium, a year in which we embarked on the renewal of both Ethiopia and of the regional organization, IGAD, of which Ethiopia is currently the chair. We have used this year of the Millennium to launch a Renaissance, to lay the foundations for this rebirth, to open the door to a new future, a future in which we will conquer poverty and disease, meet the challenge of creating a just and prosperous society based on tolerance and mutual benefit and on a national consensus, to unleash Ethiopia's full potential. This has been coupled to a foreign policy based on the concept of mutual benefits in which economic diplomacy plays a central role. Over the last seventeen years, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has demonstrated very clear differences of policy from those of the previous regime of the Derg. They are fundamental differences in aims, intentions and actions, looking to enhanced political dialogue, inclusivity and economic links within our region, and within Africa and the Arab world. We are looking to integration in a globalized world, and one in which the effects of climate change are fully addressed. In the last decade and a half, Ethiopia has focused on building democratic institutions from the grass roots, and developing responsible political space for the process of democratization, laying the foundations for real democracy and the basis of the necessary economic support.



When the EPRDF launched Ethiopia on a new path of governance seventeen years ago, this also involved the introduction of a new approach to Ethiopian diplomacy. Systematized, in 2003, as a Foreign Policy and National Security Strategy it was based on a realistic appreciation of national interests, and internal vulnerabilities, both economic and political. It identified the most critical internal threats to the survival of the Ethiopian state, economic backwardness and abject poverty, together with the need for democracy and good governance. The major enemy, poverty, could only be defeated by economic development and democratization. This has provided the fundamental basis for Ethiopia’s new foreign policy strategy, of which economic diplomacy is a central thread. It means a pragmatic approach to encourage the flow of investment, trade and tourism, as well as economic cooperation and the development of mutual trust and confidence in bilateral and multilateral relations. Genuine partners are those who contribute to Ethiopia’s economic progress and are prepared to involve themselves in a mutually beneficial partnership for economic cooperation. Peace, stability and security are necessities for economic development, and our relations are firmly anchored in the principles of good neighborliness, peaceful coexistence, the peaceful resolution of disputes and the reduction of threats to national security interests.


This last year, marking the fifth year of double digit economic growth, demonstrates how far we have come. Ethiopia is the fastest growing non-oil economy in Africa, and although this year we have had the problems of drought, coupled with the effects of global oil and food price rises and significant inflation, that still remains something of which we can be proud. The year has provided a firm jumping off point for the inauguration of the Ethiopian Renaissance. Indeed, our policy of economic diplomacy has been remarkably successful both bilaterally and more widely. Exports have grown by an average of over 25% per annum over the last five years, and this fiscal year are expected to rise from $1.5 billion to $1.87 billion. Ethiopia now exports to 120 countries, and there have been encouraging results from increasing the processing of raw materials for export, rather than merely exporting the raw materials themselves. Imports have been growing by 11%. Ethiopia in fact is a central element in what a Japanese symposium earlier this year called: Vibrant Africa – a continent of business opportunities. Examples of this abound. The new relationship launched last year with China has continued. The Africa-India Forum, and the Africa-Turkey Forum (which was co-chaired by Prime Minster Meles), have provided significant bilateral links as well as the substantial prospect of enhanced trade and investment. These have been detailed in the Delhi Declaration and the Africa-India Framework for Co-operation, and the Istanbul Declaration on Africa-Turkey partnership and Framework of Cooperation.


In January, India made its largest ever loan, of $640 million to Ethiopia, to help with the development of the sugar industry at Tendaho and Fincha. This year, one of Asia's largest conglomerates, India's Tata Holdings opened an Addis Ababa office, and last month a working delegation from the All-India Skin, Hide, Tanners and Merchants Association visited Ethiopia. Israel's International Cooperation Agency, MABHAV, signed an MoU with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development to raise agricultural productivity in August; a US company managed by Israeli experts is setting up a 30,000 hectare project for bio-diesel in the SNNPR and a Swedish company is setting up a bio-fuel development in Amhara state. Recent plans for Turkish investments include a large scale textile development and a steel mill.


In the Middle East we have launched a significant efforts to encourage trade and investment at an official and a non-governmental level. There have been encouraging signs of Saudi business interest in investment here as well as more widely from the Middle East and the Gulf states. Sheikh Ahmed bin Sulayem, chairperson of Dubai World visited in July to sign an agreement to invest in oil pipelines and to revitalize the Ethio-Djibouti Railway. Others have shown interest and commitment to agricultural and service sectors, and a Yemeni businessman has earmarked $220 million for diverse investments. All of this is being achieved while still maintaining our traditional trading and diplomatic links with the US and the EU. Indeed one of the major success stories of the last year or two has been the impressively rapid growth of horticultural exports, an area in which Holland has played a major role. Bilateral development assistance has increased significantly from the UK and Germany. The EU continues to be a major source of multi-lateral development aid. Our ties with Russia have always meant a lot to Ethiopians. Much can be said about how long standing these ties have been and also how valuable, particularly during difficult times for the nation. We have continued to deepen these ties. Italy is another country with which we have covered a lot of ground to consolidate relation. The return of the Axum Obelisk is a manifestation of this for which Ethiopia is grateful.


The Fourth Tokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD) in May this year, at which Prime Minister Meles had a very high profile role, emphasized Japan's commitment to African development, underlining two central ideas, ideas also espoused by NEPAD, the New Partnership for African Development, currently chaired by Prime Minister Meles: African ownership of the development process, and the international partnership to provide the impetus to drive the process forward. We have seen an impressive sign of this week with the opening of the new bridge over the Abay (Blue Nile) gorge, constructed with support from the Japanese government by a Japanese construction firm. Three hundred and three meters long it is the first cable-stayed bridge in East Africa. As Prime Minister Meles said at the inaugural ceremony the Hidasie (Renaissance) Bridge will not only increase the volume of traffic (expected to double in the next six years), it will provide an invaluable instrument for national development, coinciding as it does with the point at which the nation starts the realization of its renaissance. The Japanese ambassador noted that the successful collaboration over the construction of the bridge was not only a monument to Ethiopia-Japanese friendship but would also open up a new stage of industrial and development cooperation. Next week, a 36 member Japanese delegation, led by the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and including ministers, representatives of government organizations and private companies, will be visiting Ethiopia to get first hand information on trade and investment opportunities.


It's not just purely economic diplomacy where there have been considerable successes. We have strong co-operative relations with all our neighbors, relations which have been expanding and strengthening. We are currently chairing IGAD and IGAD members have agreed to revitalize the organization, currently one of the weakest economic grouping in the African Union. Ethiopia remains determined to fulfill its responsibility to IGAD's rejuvenation so it can play a real role in the peace and development of the sub-region. All have renewed their commitment to this, with the single exception of Eritrea. Eritrea, it has to be said, remains the regional villain of the peace in the Horn of Africa as it demonstrated this year by its invasion of Djibouti. Its troops are still across the border. Eritrea remains a failure, indeed a major setback, for Ethiopian diplomacy. While many in the international community do now accept that the results of demarcation must include sustainable peace and normalization of resources, we have failed to persuade Eritrea of this. Despite this setback, what has been already achieved with Sudan, Djibouti and Kenya is very encouraging.


At the same time Ethiopia is committed to the strengthening of African Unity, though this must be based on a realistic assessment of the possibilities as we made clear at the preliminary meeting on unity before the July Summit. Ethiopia, as a member of the AU Peace and Security Council for the second time, continues to play a principled role in the Council activities; it will continue to do so. We have always been very aware of our peace-keeping obligations as we earlier demonstrated in Rwanda and Burundi and are continuing to do in Liberia and now in Darfur. The excellent reputation enjoyed by Ethiopian troops in these operations has earned Ethiopia considerable plaudits and widespread appreciation and respect around Africa and the international community. Against this background criticisms leveled against Ethiopian troops in Somalia lack plausibility.


We are not confining our efforts to Africa. Relations with Yemen, where we have had frequent exchanges of visits including at the highest level, have been excellent, not just through the Sana'a Forum but bilaterally as well. Equally, we have, of course, had our problems. Our relationship with the Government of Qatar deteriorated to the point when we were reluctantly obliged to break off relations following the support provided to Eritrea and Eritrea’s continued policy of regional destabilization.



Ethiopia is of course full aware of the challenges it is facing in the process of democratization, of human rights and of good governance. Equally it has a government that is totally committed to these facets of development. We are on the right track and have made some impressive progress. Not everything has worked out as well as we might have hoped; we have had problems; we are capable of making mistakes. Some problems have lasted longer than we would have liked; Eritrea is a case in point. At the same time, this has been the first year of the New Millennium, the launching of the Renaissance. We have laid a sound foundation. Now, with a national consensus, which still needs to be strengthened further, and the will to success, we can overcome the remaining challenges of development to continue our move towards another stage in our effort to become a middle income country in a couple of decades or so. It will all take a concerted national effort, but it is well within our grasp.